Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Problems with California's yes-means-yes law

Note: This is an addendum to my first post on the matter, which endorsed affirmative consent on libertarian/property-rights-minded grounds, and refuted several counterarguments which I do not find as compelling as those below.

Although I support an affirmative consent standard as a general principle for identifying rape, there are some problems with the way California in particular has chosen to implement it.

First, I don’t like it when governments dictate policy details at private educational institutions by attaching strings to the receipt of tuition assistance. This is partly because I believe those tuition assistance programs shouldn’t exist in the first place, and there’s good reason to believe they are a huge contributor to the skyrocketing cost of college education. But such programs are even more pernicious when their primary purpose in effect is not even their stated goal of lowering tuition, but rather to grant politicians leverage over private schools who now need the handout if they are to compete with rival schools. Under such conditions, the whole scheme just becomes bribery with other people’s money. To borrow a phrase from Frank Underwood, “when the teet’s that big, everybody gets in line,” and that’s cronyism at its worst. Policies regarding whom to admit and whom to expel should be made at the level of each individual college. By using “accept or go bankrupt” grants as bait, governments can render these private organizations servile to even the most flippant political whims, which is bad for education as a general trend.

Second, if the state of California truly supports a yes-means-yes standard in identifying rape, logic indicates it should implement that standard in its criminal court system as well. Legislators’ apparent unwillingness to go that far suggests they would be uncomfortable using the yes-means-yes standard if it meant sending someone to jail, as opposed to merely expelling them from school. Of course, the average person has no qualms whatsoever about sending rapists to jail in the abstract. So if lawmakers do not believe all of the students they hope to expel from college deserve jail time as well, it raises questions about how many of them they suspect are actually rapists in the common understanding of the term (the understanding, mind you, for which state sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums were written). Surely if someone is a true sexual predator, turning them loose on the general, non-college population hardly seems better than keeping them enrolled.

The decision to pursue a less-than-jail-time remedy for campus rapists belies an obvious but unspoken truth about the 1-in-5 statistic bantied about by so many feminist reformers: the rates can only possibly be that high if you include a wide-range of distinct infractions under the same label, some of which are worse than others, and not all of which warrant many years in prison.

To be clear, I stand by the title of this post: so long as affirmative consent is absent, they are all rape, and they are immoral to a degree libertarians in particular should consider an intolerable violation of the non-aggression principle. Feminists are damn right to demand that all of these sexual infractions be illegal, and also right that even the least immoral of them warrants more forceful public outrage than many Americans presently profess. But in the process of making that case, we would do well to at least acknowledge the nuance. A long-time boyfriend who interprets the absence of resistance as a green light to go from 2nd to 3rd base with his hesitant girlfriend is wrong, and deserves punishment. Should his victim push for it, it is reasonable to argue he deserves expulsion. But in a moral sense, his offence is not equivalent to that of the stereotypical stranger jumping out of the bushes with a knife, using physical force to suppress, dominate and violate a clearly agonized victim. If all the facts were known, no jury in the country would take sympathy on the latter perpetrator, while none would make the former spend decades in jail.

Which sort of rape happens more often on college campuses? Everyone seems to have a hunch, but nobody really knows. Some portion comes from genuine misunderstanding furthered by mutual alcohol consumption, some comes from aggressive serial rapists deliberately ignoring explicit cries of discomfort, some probably fall somewhere in between. But whatever the proportions are, too many feminists deliberately gloss over these distinctions, perhaps because acknowledging them makes their statistics less shocking and their crisis less urgent than they want it to appear.

The good news is that it worked – they have successfully caught people’s attention – so at this stage it makes strategic sense to me as a feminist to exchange a bit of that shock-value for a bit more credibility. Applying a yes-means-yes standard only on college campuses, but not for the general public, creates a double standard wherein rape means different things in different places. This can only exacerbate the already dubious reputation of that 1-in-5 figure, and that’s harmful to progress in changing social mindsets.

It is because I oppose this inconsistent double standard that I want to see an affirmative consent standard in the criminal court system as well.  To some, this may seem an even more extreme position than that of the feminist reforms the past few paragraphs critique. But I don’t think it is, for two reasons. First, this would ideally be complemented by broad criminal sentencing reform, which is long overdue quite apart from your opinion on rape, granting judges more flexibility to sentence convicted rapists in a manner they deem proportional to the particular circumstances. Second, incorporating this principle into the legal code would require a much more specific definition of what constitutes “affirmative” consent to sexual activity in order to satiate the constitutional due process rights of the accused, which I think would be tremendously beneficial to clarifying this very murky subject.

This brings me to my third problem with California’s law: its definition of “affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement” is rather vague, which is problematic when schools are operating under fierce political pressures to punish as many of the accused as possible. Whereas PR management formerly gave schools a perverse incentive to sweep rape accusations under the rug, the interest in keeping federal aid and avoiding highly public federal investigation now appears to be creating new (but also perverse!) incentives in the opposite direction, wherein schools consider expelling any male students found to engage in a drunken hookup to be “erring on the safe side.” This is probably a preferable trend on net than what it used to be, but at the extremes it creates horror stories every bit as infuriating as the prior system.

Occidental college’s official policy now reads that even if consent is offered explicitly and affirmatively, it can be silently withdrawn through any “outward demonstration” of hesitation or uncertainty, in which case “sexual activity must cease immediately” or else its rape. Perhaps failing to pick up on body language indicating second thoughts after consent has already been given makes one a bad lover, but a rapist? Withdrawal of consent is one thing that SHOULD require explicit notice if one is to accuse one’s partner of rape. A

Meanwhile, students in Nova Scotia are pushing for a definition that is quite literally “more than yes”-means-yes. Explicit verbal consent to sexual activity is not enough, they argue, if those words are not spoken at a certain minimum volume to guarantee their sincerity! The same people who have for years reprimanded men that “no means no” now advise them that yes also means no!

Even Amanda Hess of Slate, who supports the law, admits “[i]t’s a bit ironic that the lawmakers behind the California bill seem more comfortable specifying what constitutes rape than actually describing what clear, unambiguous, enthusiastic consensual sex looks like.” For example, she asks, can affirmative consent be given while drunk? It is clear from the word “conscious” that it cannot be given when someone is so drunk as to be unconscious, which should have been self-explanatory anyway. But there is an enormous spectrum of drunkenness between unconsciousness and total sobriety, and very many if not most sexual encounters in college feature participants who fall somewhere in between.

I happen to believe that you can consent to sex while drunk, up to a point that is near the point of passing out, which I will explain more thoroughly in an upcoming post. Most colleges today, by contrast, are adjudicating these cases on the advice of Brett Sokolow, who argues that in cases of even minimal alcohol incapacitation, “they could be stark naked and demanding sex and it’s irrelevant.”. Resolving this confusion should be seen as a primary benefit of affirmative consent laws, because the whole point of affirmative consent is that it is relevant whether the accuser gave outward affirmation that they consented to the sexual activity. It is unnecessary, under such a standard, to futilely demand that both participants engage in some approximate mental breathalyzer assessment of the other before proceeding, since it is the reasonable perception of the initiator which matters more than the frame of mind of the accuser. This simplicity should be appreciated by conservatives and libertarians who value personal accountability for decisions made while drunk in other settings, and is consistent with most state laws about DUI, public intoxication, or any other crime.

In any case, a serious standard should find a way of drawing that line more specifically, because if it doesn’t, the ambiguity will make judicial decision-makers more susceptible to institutional biases. The more room for interpretation there is in the law’s definition of affirmative consent, the more colleges will need to “err” on the side of expulsion – not because they’re convinced the accused is actually guilty, but because they want to keep federal dollars and appease social critics who might tarnish their reputation.


Nevertheless, affirmative consent remains a solid guiding principle for identifying rape at colleges and everywhere else. With a few tweaks and additions, other states should follow California’s lead in switching to this standard.

Monday, July 27, 2015

Libertarians should support affirmative consent


The State of California made history last fall by becoming the first state in the nation to adopt any form of a “yes means yes” standard for adjudicating rape on college campuses. The most important part of the bill requires all colleges and universities receiving state funds in California to adopt a policy that includes:

(1) An affirmative consent standard in the determination of whether consent was given by both parties to sexual activity. “Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent.

Predictably, many of my favorite libertarian commenters – from columnists on Reason.com to FIRE president Greg Lukianoff – have come out strongly against the bill. State involvement in higher education is controversial in the first place, and to small government advocates, legislating the nuances of our most intimate relations is understandably even more upsetting. Just as libertarians want the state out of your bedroom on birth control, marriage, homosexuality, polygamy and infidelity, we are instinctually repulsed to laws dictating the minutiae of our sexual encounters.

But I take a different view, and I don’t think it’s at all contradictory with my libertarian leanings. In fact, I think ideologically consistent libertarians should wholeheartedly support affirmative consent legislation. The reason is relatively simple, and it involves a body of law and philosophy with which libertarians of all people should be well acquainted: property rights.

Imagine Frank and George are neighbors. One day, George is in hurry to cut the grass, but he discovers his lawn mower won’t start – it needs repairs. Frustrated, he looks over to Frank’s yard and notices Frank’s lawn mower sitting idle. George is on good terms with Frank, and he suspects it wouldn’t be a problem if he were to borrow the tractor for the next hour. Unfortunately, Frank is not home for George to ask his permission, and does not answer his cell phone. But in his haste, George decides to just assume Frank will be fine with it, and uses his neighbor’s tractor to cut his lawn.

Now, suppose Frank came home a few minutes later and caught George using his tractor without permission. Further suppose that for whatever reason, Frank becomes incensed by this, and they get into a riff. In the course of things, their neighborly relationship deteriorates, and Frank decides to file charges against George for stealing his things. They show up in court on the arranged date, and the judge asks George if he used Frank’s lawn mower. He admits he did.

At this point in the proceedings, would you think it an appropriate course of legal inquiry for the judge to turn to Frank, and ask “Well, what reason did you give this man to believe that he COULDN’T use your lawn mower?”

Or, would it be more consistent with your notions of ownership for the judge to ask George a follow-up question: “Well, why did you believe this was okay? What indication did your neighbor give you that you had permission to use his property?”

As Kevin Drum of Mother Jones observes, we already apply affirmative consent to most things. If improperly borrowing a lawn mower seems like too trivial a violation to analogize, imagine instead that it was a car your neighbor borrowed from you, so that he could run an errand at the grocery store. Or, imagine they decided to use your house to throw a party while you were away on vacation. Neither of these rise to the level of bodily violation either, but both would be a rather intrusive request, to use a very private piece of property, which most people don’t just lend out on a whim. Either request might plausibly be consented to had the question been posed preemptively by a close and trusted friend. But neither request can be assumed in the absence of explicit permission.

Sex is the same way. People’s bodies are their first and most important form of property, truly the origin of all other property rights. For a group which claims to value the right to self-ownership so highly, many libertarians seem insufficiently outraged by the extent to which these foremost of all rights are being violated in the campus rape epidemic. If theft is the use or seizure of property without permission, and rape is the use of someone’s body without permission, we should apply the same legal standard to decide what constitutes “permission” both cases. Affirmative consent does that.

When I voice this opinion to my fellow libertarians, I usually encounter three main counterarguments. I’ll refute them here starting with the most common.

1. “Yes means yes renders the accused guilty until proven innocent.”

Reason’s Robby Soave makes versions of this argument here and here, while Shikha Dalmia made it here (quote: “by changing the assumption from "presumed innocent" to "presumed guilty," this new standard will inevitably snag some guys who earnestly meant no harm.) Cathy Young agrees, writing “It effectively shifts the burden of proof to the accused…In practice, this means that any minimally plausible charge is likely to be upheld.” The bulk of the objection arises from the idea that because the accused (often the man) needs to demonstrate he got consent for it to not be rape, he is essentially presumed a rapist until he can prove otherwise.

But this is not the case, because the accuser still has the burden of demonstrating that the accused used her body in the first place (and inversely, the accused has no burden to disprove this). Put another way, the accused is only called to demonstrate that they acquired consent if they already concede the sexual activity took place.

Again, this is analogous to theft. In the lawn mower analogy, the Fred still needs to prove that George did, in fact, use his lawn mower; if George denies that, the burden remains with Fred to demonstrate otherwise. And in like manner, if a woman accuses a man who she has never actually met of raping her (perhaps because she confuses him for the real guy), and he denies having ever penetrated her, the new law will not place any additional legal burden on him to clear his name.

Affirmative consent only comes into play in those cases where the accused concedes sexual advances took place, but claims they were justified because the other person consented to them. That this happens to encompass most college rape cases is precisely why it’s such an important addendum to the law. Unlike the “it wasn’t me!” defense, this second defense is a positive claim which requires substantiation from the defendant, in much the same way a claim of “acting in self-defense” or “not guilty by reason of insanity” requires substantiation in a murder trial. If George tells the judge “Yeah I used the lawn mower, but I thought I had permission to do so,” it is now he who is trying to demonstrate something in court – not Fred.

The accused need not prove he obtained affirmative consent any more than George Zimmerman needed to prove he feared for his life. He just needs to reasonably argue it.

Just as most men accused of rape on college campuses concede some sexual activity took place, George Zimmerman conceded that he killed Trayvon Martin. But penetration does not necessarily make you a rapist, and killing does not necessarily make you a murderer. There are some conditions (defined by law) under which killing is justified. So from that point on in his trial, the question before the court was this: “Is there a reasonable doubt that George Zimmerman killed Trayvon Martin, without it being in self-defense, as the state defines it?” And likewise, in rape cases adjudicated under a yes-means-yes standard, the question before the court is this: “Is there a reasonable doubt (or preponderance of the evidence, as the case may be) that person X penetrated person Y without receiving Y’s affirmative consent, as the state defines it?”

It is still the accuser who has the burden of proving the answer to that question is yes. The accused need only describe to the jury the positive indications of consent they received in order to make their defense plausible. If they cannot do that, they probably received no such indications, in which case they are probably a rapist. If they can, and those indications comport with the legal definition of consent and how it may be conveyed, the court’s line of questioning will likely return to the accuser to see if she (or he) can dispute those claims. And either way, the legal requirements for proving guilt are not inverted: it remains the accuser’s responsibility to surmount the evidentiary standard.

2. “Yes means yes restricts students’ due process rights by mandating the preponderance of the evidence standard.”

Greg Lukianoff of FIRE (who I deeply respect and generally agree with) made this argument to me in person at the Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention last fall. He basically argues that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard employed by the California law is too flimsy, and should be replaced by a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for so long as colleges remain in charge of the process (ultimately, both Lukianoff and myself would prefer these cases be adjudicated at the criminal level, and that colleges be left to set their own policies on the matter. See my follow up post on “caveats” for more on why).

But colleges have always used the preponderance of the evidence standard for allegations of wrongdoing, rape or otherwise. When students are accused of cheating or vandalism or underage drinking, colleges across the country must decide whether to expel them from school. There has never been a burden of proof on either party in these proceedings, and the new law does not add one. The “preponderance of the evidence” standard has never been considered a violation of the accused's due process rights in the past, because the maximum penalty a college can enact is expulsion, and nobody has a "right" to attend a college.

I share Lukianoff’s concerns that colleges are being unduly pressured to heighten their expulsion percentages by the federal government for political reasons. I also agree that on a moral level, rape is more equitable to murder and burglary (crimes deemed too severe for college courts, and so handled exclusively by state prosecutors) than it is to cheating on a test. But a more active role for college investigators is still appropriate here, for two reasons.

First, the criminal justice system has proven horribly lax about punishing (or even investigating!) alleged rapists for decades now, due in part to indifference and in part to the inherent difficulty of proving what goes on behind closed doors. If colleges cannot rely on the law to defend their students from rape, they must defend them in some other way.

Second, these cases arise on college campuses, between college students, at a vastly disproportionate rate relative to their occurrence in the non-college population. With all we know about college alcohol and hook-up cultures, this should strike you as intuitively likely even if you doubt the extensive empirical evidence for it. To the extent that there exists a “campus rape epidemic,” colleges have both moral and market justifications for doing everything they can to purge this epidemic from among them.

By analogy, the US military also has an enormous problem with sexual assault. Sexual assault is a crime, which can be prosecuted and sometimes is. Victims of sexual assault within the military are fully justified in filing criminal charges against their attackers should they wish. But in the event they choose not to do this, the military still has a strong interest in expunging potential culprits of sexual assault from its ranks. Consequently, men with a shady record of sexual assault accusations are very often kicked out of the military, even if the evidence arrayed against them does not rise to the level necessary to justify imprisonment. Nobody seems to have a problem with this, because combatting sexual assault in the military is seen as a more important priority than ensuring that nobody is ever unjustly denied employment there. So it is with college enrollment.

If we’re talking about the death penalty, it may indeed be better that 100 guilty people go free than it is for one innocent person to be condemned. But when the penalty is disenrollment from a course of study – merely the cessation of a business transaction – surely it is not better. This is especially true when the evidence suggests most rapes are committed by repeat offenders (such that the risk of letting one off the hook is greater than for crimes with lower recidivism rates).

From a macro perspective, people who truly care about the individual rights of college students should be much more alarmed by the reality of ongoing mass rape than by the risk that some student somewhere might be improperly expelled. You have no right to a collegiate education, but you do have one to bodily autonomy.

Finally, what of people who reject that premise? Many libertarians do not believe in natural rights theory and base their views on more utilitarian grounds. These people have voiced a litany of consequentialist objections to affirmative consent, which (broadly characterized) sound something like this:

3. Principle aside, the law is a pragmatic nightmare. Affirmative consent enacts sweeping and sudden changes to the legal definition of rape that do not comport with how most people have consensual sex, rendering most sexual encounters technically illegal. Consequently, it will either never be enforced (in which case why have it?) or result mainly in the expulsion of innocent people.

This view is generally predicated on a misconception about what affirmative consent requires. Due to the “yes means yes” marketing, many people seem to think it demands the exact word “yes,” without substitute, in response to a direct, formal and explicit request for permission to perform a specific act. Others imagine a sort of clumsy spoken contract, something along the lines of “I hereby consent to let you finger my vagina,” etc. They worry that if this phrase or some rough equivalent is not murmured at each and every stage of the escalation (which it obviously won’t be), it is rape. Slate’s Amanda Hess catalogues the hysteria:

“You may have heard of this bill as the one that would require students to draft up a written sex contract before bed or constantly proclaim “yes, yes, yes!” at every slight readjustment, thereby practically redefining most sex as rape. The Fresno Bee editorial board interpreted the bill to mean that “ ‘yes’ only means ‘yes’ if it is said aloud.” The Daily Californian, the independent student newspaper of UC–Berkeley, also claimed that affirmative consent is necessarily verbal. RH Reality Check advanced the game to approvingly say that affirmative consent requires “a verbal or written yes.” If consensual sex entailed that level of consent, millions of couples would be unsuspectingly raping one another every night of the week.

There’s a lot of hyperbole here, and perhaps it’s born of defensiveness. People likely use their own college sexual encounters to envision how these things go down, and fret that in their experience, there wasn’t always an explicit question asked. Maybe kissing escalated into heavy petting which escalated into intercourse somewhat seamlessly, with few words spoken in the process. Could I be found guilty of rape, they panic? Perish the thought! Any standard that might catch up innocent, well-meaning people – people like them! – must be absurd.

Were these wild claims about what consensual sex must look like true, I would agree that affirmative consent amounts to an unreasonable burden few people would actually follow. But they’re not true, because that’s not what “affirmative” means in this context.

First off, nothing about the word “affirmative” requires that the consent be verbal. People communicate with looks and body language all the time, and this is especially true during sex. Just as certain behaviors could convey a “no” under the old standard without requiring that the word be said, there is such thing as a silent yes. Even affirmative consent opponent David Bernstein concedes that “the affirmative consent standard leaves room for a defense that the complainant provided appropriate non-verbal cues that signified consent” in this post, as means of excoriating the even stricter standard of “explicit consent” endorsed by the Office on Violence Against Women (which I, too, oppose as a legal requirement). By any sane definition, “yes means yes” does not require that the yes be explicit or detailed. It just requires some “affirmation” of consent. Active, enthusiastic participation in the entirety of the sexual activity counts as that, even if no words were spoken and no contract was signed.

Interpreted as it should be, this does comport with how most people have sex. Without getting into too much detail, I’ll put the matter this way: do women who are excited about impending intercourse normally lie on the mattress motionless, in an expectant, spread-eagle posture rather resembling that of a starfish? Or do they generally do something, participate in some way, that lets their partner know they’re into it and provides some active affirmation that they are onboard with the proceedings?

Screw it, I will get into detail! Affirmative consent can be conveyed by being on top – by riding a man in the cowgirl (or reverse cowgirl!) position. Affirmative consent can be conveyed by grabbing the penis and guiding it in from the missionary position. It can be conveyed by text messaging dirty invitations from afar. It can be conveyed by taking off one’s panties. It can be conveyed by purchasing a condom and winking, or asking if he has a condom with a suggestive look on one’s face. None of these behaviors override an explicit no, nor even necessarily prove that the consent was ongoing throughout. They may not settle the matter entirely, or preclude any possible holding of wrongdoing on the part of the accused. But they could all be plausibly cited in court as an indication of affirmative consent that would satisfy the law’s language and pass the rational person test, without requiring any oral communication whatsoever.

Of course, some schools may not share my interpretation of the law, and opponents worry the text is too vague to make clear whether the above actions would constitute consent. But for those worried about government overreach, broad text is a strength, not a flaw. In fact, it is precisely because the parameters of affirmative consent are left unspecified that the breathless fear of expulsions gone haywire is misplaced. On the places where the law is vague, it leaves discretion with the schools: precisely where that discretion lie before the law was passed. Phrased differently, individual colleges will only interpret the law in a way that results in vastly more expulsions if they already otherwise wanted to expel vastly more students (which, again, they were already free to do).

Cathy Young objects that a claim of nonverbal affirmative consent “would leave fact-finders, in real courts or campus pseudo-courts, to try to decide such questions as: Was a head motion a nod that indicated a "yes"? Does pulling someone closer during an embrace amount to consent to sex? Does a passionate response to a kiss amount to a "nonverbal cue"?

Perhaps, but courts are already involved in adjudicating the minutiae of sexual encounters. The law just gives them much-needed guidance on how to do so consistently and fairly, where previously there was none. Misinterpreted body language of the sort Young describes happens every week on college campuses, and college tribunals are already called upon to determine if an assault occurred in those cases. At present, the question most of them have been using for that task is “did any of those signals amount to a no?”. That shouldn’t be the question; it should be, “did any of those signals amount to a yes?” It still won’t always be easy to answer this question, but at least this new one approaches consent from the libertarian mindset of transferrable self-ownership.

With this in mind, the consequentialist argument for Yes Means Yes is really quite sensible. Hess explains:

“This standard improves on the old “no means no” model in a number of ways. A partner who is asleep or passed out can’t say “no.” Neither can a partner who’s frozen in shock or fear when an encounter escalates into an assault. Victims who are threatened with sexual assault aren’t always equipped to respond in rape prevention talking points. Just like with any other violent physical assault, many victims respond by shutting down, going silent, or laying motionless, hoping not to anger their attackers further, or disassociating from the attacks as an attempt at self-preservation. Also, consenting to sex one time doesn’t mean consenting to sex any other time. And consenting to one act (like vaginal intercourse) doesn’t imply consent for all other acts (like anal sex). Having sex with a person who is lying limply on a bed is not consensual, unless that person happens to be really, really into that—but that’s a situation that requires a conversation, not an assumption.

So are affirmative consent laws a good idea? If they are broad enough to include nonverbal cues, I think so. If we can admit that enthusiastic consent is often communicated in body language or knowing looks, then we must also accept that the lack of consent doesn’t always manifest itself in a shouted “no” or “stop,” either. It shouldn’t be the sole responsibility of the uninterested party to speak up during a sexual encounter. If you think it’s easy for a person to just say no, then why would it be so hard for his or her partner to just ask?"

That will hopefully be the only major consequence of a legal shift towards affirmative consent: pressure on men to just ask. Affirmative consent will very likely change nothing about how loving, committed couples have sex. Where it might have a chilling effect is on promiscuous frat bro culture where guys compete to see who can fuck the most women. If that happens, it would be a major step forward for society. I disagree with a lot of what Ezra Klein wrote on the law, for reasons Connnor Freidersdorf explains well here. But I agreed wholeheartedly with this part:


“The Yes Means Yes law could also be called the You Better Be Pretty Damn Sure law. You Better Be Pretty Damn Sure she said yes…If you're not, then you better fucking ask.”

Thursday, July 16, 2015

The (perceived) dearth of preventative action by women does not discredit the "1-in-5 college women are raped" statistic

From time to time, skeptics of the statistic that 1-in-5 women in college are raped make the following argument against its credibility:

"If rape were really so pervasive, we'd see college women doing more to avoid it."

Some of these skeptics (Christina Hoff Summers comes to mind) are guilty of what feminists call “slut-shaming” or “victim-blaming,” which ought not be taken seriously as arguments against the stat (Google those terms if you’re uninitiated; there are plenty of good feminist sites out there to catch you up to speed). But not all of them are, and accusing anyone who employs this argument of such offenses is intellectually lazy. The argument is wrong, but not necessarily for those reasons.

One of the smarter skeptics is Shikha Dalmia, a libertarian writer for Reason whose work I greatly admire. Careful reading of Dalmia’s argument makes clear she is NOT arguing women who fail to take preventative action share some responsibility for their rape. Rather, she is pointing out only that the absence of widespread preventative action is an indication women are not very worried by the prospect of rape, which she feels they would be were the figures as high as feminists claim. But this is still a bad argument, for two reasons.

First, acquaintance rape can be pervasive in absolute terms without being likely on a per-hookup basis, such that even if the 1-in-5 figure is true, many rational women would not necessarily feel pressured away from certain behaviors until it was too late. Dalmia writes, "if the hook-up culture is pervasive on campuses, it's because [women] don't find the risk they take to be incommensurable with the sexual upside they expect.” But comparing the expected likelihood of sexual gratification to the expected likelihood of being raped by one’s partner for any given sexual encounter selected at random says little about the cumulative portion of women which could wind up as rape victims over longer stretches of sexual activity.

To see why, recognize that the number of sexually active women on your average college campus is likely much greater than 1 in 5. Then, consider that many of these women have several different sexual encounters each year, at different times, with different men. These realities result in an enormous volume of consensual hookups on college campuses. Imagine (as feminists posit) that a small band of men habitually take advantage of these women whenever they get one alone. Imagine they do this often, and (for intuitive reasons) never with the same woman twice. In the context of so many hookups, it’s easy to see how the portion of women who will ever be taken advantage of by a peer during their entire four years at college could approach one-in-five, even while the likelihood that any given hookup will result in rape may still be very low. If that’s an accurate depiction of what’s happening, women would have little reason to fear any individual hookup, even if their long term risks were considerably more frightening.

By analogy, the vast majority of food served at restaurants will not give the consumer food poisoning. As such, the vast majority of people do not greatly diminish their consumption of restaurant food for fear of getting food poisoning. And yet, due to the large sample size, very many people - t
he CDC estimates 1 in 6 – will get food poisoning at some point in a given year. And remember, for college rape statistics, the number presented is 1-in-5 by the end of four years, not just one, so depending on the frequency with which the average student has sex, the per-instance rapes may be even more dispersed.

(In fairness to Dalmia, this also means that over time, statistics using absolute numbers of rapes, or the % of women who have been raped, may conceal other important trends in the sample size of sex being had. If 1 in 5 women were raped in 1950, and 1 in 5 women were raped in 2014, but women in general are finding themselves alone in bed with men by their own volition three times as often now as they did then due to loosening social restraints on female sexuality, the likelihood of being raped during any given sexual encounter has gone down. If so, that's good, and the data feminists choose to advertise doesn't account for that decrease.

But that still doesn't diminish the absolute size of the problem. The more people are doing something, the more problematic the risks of that thing become for society as a whole, and the more legislation may be justified to mitigate those risks. If 1 in 5 football players get concussions, the benefit accrued from concussion prevention education programs increases as the number of people playing football increases, and vice-versa. The more people are having sex, the more it makes sense to have laws which protect us from the dangers of sex.)

But secondly, and more importantly, it seems women DO take all kinds of preventative action, and that the need for them to take such action is almost as potent an oppressive force as is the incidence of rape itself. Amanda Taub and Ezra Klein worded this more eloquently than I could in their respective blog posts:
  • When our society treats consent as "everything other than sustained, active, uninterrupted resistance," that misclassifies a whole range of behavior as sexually inviting. That, in turn, pressures women to avoid such behavior in order to protect themselves from assault. As a result, certain opportunities are left unavailable to women, while still others are subject to expensive safety precautions, such as not traveling for professional networking unless you can afford your own hotel room. It amounts, essentially, to a tax that is levied exclusively on women. And it sucks.” – Taub

  • “Every woman I spoke to talked about this tax in the same way: as utterly constant, completely unrelenting. It's so pervasive that it often goes unmentioned, like gravity. But it colors everything. What you wear. Who you have lunch with. When you can hug a friend. Whether you can invite someone back to your house. How you speak in meetings. Whether you can ask male colleagues out for a drink to talk about work. How long you can chat with someone at a party. Whether you can go on a date without having a friend who knows to be ready for a call in case things go wrong. Whether you can accept seemingly professional invitations from older men in your field. Whether you can say yes when someone wants to pick up the tab for drinks. For men, this is like ultraviolet light: it's everywhere, but we can't see it.” - Klein


Dalmia writes: "The sexual revolution gave women control over their sexual destiny by letting them conduct their sexual lives based on their own individual risk-reward assessment without being stigmatized as prudes or sluts." But how much control do they really have over their sexual destiny if the downside of having a lot of sex is now, instead of being stigmatized as a slut, being raped? As a libertarian, isn't that a far worse and more coercive method of control, which the sexual revolution ought also to logically oppose? Do men face the same risk when they choose to have a lot of sex? If not, isn't that an injustice?


If it is an injustice, is it an unavoidable inequity written into the nature of things? Or is this injustice rooted directly in the alterable behavior of men in the aggregate, which we as social reformers ought do our best to rectify through alteration of that behavior?

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

Favorite this blogger

I've just stumbled upon a fantastic progressive blog by Frederic de Boer, which is well worth a look if not a spot on your favorites bar. This post in particular echoes so much of what I've written about the climate of modern online feminism, except it does it much more succinctly than I was able to do here, herehere, here, here, here, here and here. Some quotes (of his):

  • "I meet and interact with a lot of young lefties who are just stunning rhetorically weak; they feel all of their politics very intensely but can’t articulate them to anyone who doesn’t share the same vocabulary, the same set of cultural and social signifiers that are used to demonstrate you’re one of the “right sort of people.” These kids are often great, they’re smart and passionate, I agree with them on most things, but they have no ability at all to express themselves to those who are not already in their tribe. They say terms like “privilege” or “mansplain” or “tone policing” and expect the conversation to somehow just stop, that if you say the magic words, you have won that round and the world is supposed to roll over to what you want."
  • "the idiom of aggressive condescension and blank derision is not going to convince anybody, no matter how well trained people are to ape it."
  • "The schizophrenia of today’s social justice left is that it recounts all of the ways in which it is currently losing but does it with the belittling attitude of a team that’s running up the score...if you think that the places you hang out online are indicative of the world, then you always are winning in your own mind."
  • "People who consider themselves dedicated to achieving political change have this fact to confront: it has never been easier to live in an intellectual cul-de-sac."
  • "Of all types of political arguments, none is less likely to broaden your coalition than the one that makes your targets feel ridiculed. When people say that those who have been called out online should respond by apologizing and learning, they are betraying a profound ignorance about human psychology. That just is not how people work."
Best of all, I can safely refer my readers to his blog WITHOUT perpetuating the same ideological echo-chamber he laments, because he is pretty far left and seems to disagree with me on lots of things. Which is refreshing, because it didn't prevent him from getting that post exactly right.

Tuesday, June 16, 2015

Can conservatives and libertarians be feminists?

Short answer: Of course!

Long answer: Some feminists don’t think so, but they’re wrong. Here’s an excerpt of a discussion I had on the Hopkins Feminists page explaining why. As always, names are changed, my comments are in regular font, and other people’s comments are in colored italics.


Opinions on this? If we can glean value from competing perspectives, is the critique of feminism as a left-wing political tool constructive? Can there be a right-wing feminist movement?

(I'm not sure how Politico is as a source, but it seems fairly neutral in terms of right-wing/left-wing politics.)

Chrissy: I think she makes a good point that it has been used as a political tool. It would be great if feminism transcended politics because it was universally supported and accepted. Until that's the case, there is always going to be someone using it for political gain. I also think her definition of feminism is to narrow. "A feminist is a woman who lives the life she chooses." I think that is a good start, but shouldn't it include advocating for the equality of all people and against the structures in society that prevent that?

James: I thought we already had words for right-wing feminism? Like "white feminism" and "trans-exclusionary radical feminism."

I mean like, I don't even have to google things she's said in the past to start poking holes in her argument that she's promoting a new useful perspective on feminism, when it's really just a conservative flavor that already exists. She provides the proof right in this article. Stuff like: "She pushed for school choice, which Democrats largely oppose, saying it benefits low-income mothers and daughters." No, it allows gentrification and urban re-segregation to accelerate by removing the responsibility to improve schools used by the poorest urban residents who can't afford any transportation.

The article actually points out that OTC birth control from a Republican perspective is just a plot, because Republicans do their best to keep OTC medicines off ACA plans.
She supports a 20-week abortion plan.

Then if you do go looking for other things she said, she doesn't even support pay equality legislation. (http://www.ibtimes.com/carly-fiorina-women-speech-ex-hp...)

Feminism that ignores the intersection with class is just shoddy and empty.

I mean, at least she says she supports transgender rights, but given she used the phrase "open to transgenders," it doesn't sound like she has her heart or mind in it and is just picking up the current political wind.

Me: I think the answer to your question is yes, there can be a right-wing feminist movement, it's just that John and others who think like him would oppose the right-wing parts of it. I'm very not-right-wing myself, but I totally support school choice and OTC birth control. Far from ignoring the intersection with class, I think both ideas would make life better for both women and the poor. That doesn't make me less of a feminist, it just means I disagree with John on economic and philosophical issues which reasonable, well-intentioned people (and even reasonable, well-intentioned feminists) can and do disagree.

Emily: First of all, Chrissy, I agree that Carly Fiorina's definition of a feminist is too narrow; also, my initial reaction was to agree with you, James, about what "GOP feminism" might mean and about what Carly Fiorina specifically means by it. However, after some thought I also imagined the possibility that a right wing feminist movement could be based on intersectional interests but with a more liberal economic slant (like what Andrew Doris pointed out). I was inspired more by this idea than by Ms. Fiorina's statements when I made my post.

So, thank you for helping me feel out my own ideas about this subject! I actually think we are all on similar pages with regard to this idea, if not this politician. I suppose that for now, we can all agree that in the current, extremely partisan political climate right wing feminism = "white" feminism, but in a world where anything is possible, right wing feminism could actually be an alternative way for all feminists to approach the issues they are interested in.

Alexis: Just real quick: I'm not sure that a "liberal economic slant" is compatible with thoroughgoing feminism. Like, if capitalism is the system under which black, poor, and female people are exploited for their labor, how can that system be feminist?

Emily: That is also a good point

Me: You presuppose the contested point, Alexis. Your comment boils down to "if this left-leaning, anti-capitalist theory about which economic system is best for black/poor/female people is correct, how can capitalism be feminist?" But the whole debate is about whether that theory is correct in the first place, which seems like a matter better debated by economists than sociologists. By analogy, the US's foreign policy towards ISIS will also likely have enormous implications for the wellbeing of poor, brown women in that region - but of course feminists can disagree on what the best foreign policy is, too.

We can't go around promising people that "feminism is just about equality between men and women!" and then pretend the implications of that in all sectors of policy, ethics, academics and life are obvious and straightforward. Smart people draw different implications from that shared starting point. The less divergence you tolerate within the boundaries of the definition, the more assumptions feminist arguments are predicated upon, and the less morally compelling the feminist cause becomes. So either you narrow the sales pitch and admit that feminism is an highly contentious set of mostly-left-wing ideas which many reasonable people can and do think are wrong, or you open the gates to people you might disagree with on a whole host of peripheral issues in an attempt to get results on the areas of consensus.

If you choose the former approach, that’s fine, but you should make sure to specify and publicize just what the defining criteria of feminism are from the start. You should also realize that feminism will lose much of the mainstream appeal it has recently gathered from people who believe men and women are equal, but don’t share your conception of equality in practice. And when people start making #WhyI’mNotAFeminist movements on Twitter because they disagree with you on the minimum wage or tax rates or healthcare or what have you, you can no longer accuse them of misunderstanding what feminism means, because you were the one who defined it in a way which excluded them.

Or, you could choose the latter approach, and allow feminism to become a bigger tent on issues that aren't quintessentially feminist turf. This is my approach. No two of us in this group agree on every issue that intersects with gender equality. If we were each to exclude and disown anyone who differed from our stances on any of these issues, we'd wind up with the "no true Scotsman" fallacy wherein we all insist we’re the pure ones and they’re the traitors. It's the Judean People's Front attacking the People's Front of Judea, and it's not productive.

As a libertarian, I happen to believe some of the non-libertarian tendencies occasionally expressed by members of this group are actually counterproductive to women's rights and welfare. If I were nitpicky and looking for a fight, I suppose I could dismiss these ideas as "statist feminism," or some other pejorative prefix meant to be read as "not real" feminism. I refrain from that because the reasons I disagree with those ideologies have little to do with feminism's essential correctness, and I don't think the infighting which would result on this page would be helpful towards the advancement of the very many feminist issues I care deeply about.

Carly Fiorina is wrong about an awful lot, but if she says she's a feminist, I’ll welcome her to the discussion about what that means.

Also, here are examples of some awesome free-market feminist websites, for any who are interested:
http://cathyreisenwitz.com/blog/

Alexis: Sure, I guess if we disagree on what capitalism is, then fine. But we do, and I think that there is no capitalism without the exploitation of labor (where does value come from) and that fundamental to the exploitation of labor is the exploitation of women's bodies through reproductive labor. So you can try to have a feminist free market, but as long as it produces wealth, that wealth is coming from somewhere, and I bet it's the bodies of women and non-white and poor people, and to me that's not feminist.

James
: ^Second what Alexis said, and expand reproductive labor to all intimate labor - from childbearing/rearing to nursing to sex work to house/hotel cleaning. Capitalism consistently puts women in jobs where they are expected to provide care and intimacy, and underpays them because that emotional attachment means employees are more likely to go above and beyond for free, and less likely to complain openly or strike. The same thing can happen to men (women aren't "more emotional" that's BS) but women are put in these jobs and roles at an extremely disproportionate rate.

Sam:
Here is another concrete example of feminism without an analysis of class: if a you are "pro-choice" but support economic policies that make abortion unaffordable for millions of women, you are not pro-choice, full stop. http://thinkprogress.org/.../cost-abortion-investigation/


And far from creating conditions of freedom, libertarianism simply further privatizes coercion. The workplace is already a site of ubiquitous violence against and coercion of women; in fact many libertarians are OK with a boss having the 'right' to tell a worker, "fuck me or you're fired" (quoting from the article below).

Libertarianism is 'freedom' for a tiny minority to immiserate, exploit, and literally rape the vast majority of ordinary people. It cannot be "feminist" if "feminism" is to remain a meaningful word:

http://crookedtimber.org/.../let-it-bleed-libertarianism.../

Me: I’ll engage each of the arguments you made, but as I’ll explain at the end, I think they’re besides the point.

Response to Emily - the labor theory of value is one of the most soundly refuted tenets of Marxism. I could labor all day in my backyard making mud pies, but if nobody wants those pies, I wouldn't have created anything valuable. Labor has no inherent worth, and it can be invested into both productive and non-productive ventures. Markets are that system by which labor is funneled into the most productive, in-demand ventures, as identified by the democratic signaling of millions of aggregated economic transactions. Of course markets produce wealth, and of course that wealth comes from somewhere – which are both very good things, and especially for the least-wealthy!

Response to James - I wholly agree with you that “women are put in these jobs and roles at an extremely disproportionate rate,” and that’s problematic. I disagree that is capitalism’s doing. I think it’s patriarchy’s doing. Capitalism operating under conditions of prevailing patriarchal social norms may lead to suboptimal results without being the root cause of those outcomes. By challenging and eroding these pressures and expectations, we can have a society in which those jobs you mentioned are both more evenly divided by gender and more accurately priced/compensated on an open market, that is still fully compatible with capitalism. In fact, without some sort of market pricing mechanism, I’m curious how you propose to compensate people who do those sorts of jobs.

Response to Sam - If you oppose the myriad of state regulations that artificially restrict supply and purposefully drive up the price of important health services like abortion, you’ll find no stronger allies than libertarians. Most cost barriers to abortion access result from punitive state intervention by social conservatives deliberately trying to price people out of the market, not any natural scarcity in the services demanded. Women should not have to “struggle to navigate a maze of state laws that make it increasingly burdensome and expensive to get an abortion,” as your article rightly lamented, because abortion is nobody’s business but theirs and their doctors, and there should be rather few laws on the subject.

That said, the right to an abortion is a negative right – a subset of the general right to do as you please without harming others – not a positive claim to other people’s time, energies, expertise or resources. Abortions would be vastly cheaper and more accessible in a free market, but they would not be free, and they can never be free, so somebody somewhere will always have to pay for them. That person should be the person receiving the service, because every alternative requires violence. Being pro-choice does not necessitate a willingness to pay for other people’s choices, nor to coerce others into paying for those choices – full stop.

But again, all of this is besides the point. As it relates to the original post that started this thread, it’s totally reasonable for us to disagree vehemently on these abstract philosophical issues. It’s unreasonable, or at least unwise, to use these issues as a litmus test for feminism. Far from “feminism without an analysis of class,” mine seems like feminism with a thoughtful and detailed analysis of class that just so happens to differ from your analysis. If what you’re saying when you pit capitalism (or libertarian economics, or even just modest market reform) as contradictory to feminism is “you can’t be a feminist unless you’re also a radical socialist,” I think that’s wildly out of touch with what even most self-described feminists in this country believe, and certainly out of sync with the way feminism has been marketed to on-the-fence converts in recent years. More importantly, it’s counterproductive to our shared objectives, which disappoints me more than encountering yet more people who think we libertarians are psychopaths who hate the poor.

Emily: It seems a bit empty jargon-y to say that "the labor theory of value is one of the most soundly refuted tenets of Marxism" (of course: capitalism makes sure that, as you say, labor and value are disconnected by the market) and then say "Of course markets produce wealth, and of course that wealth comes from somewhere – which are both very good things, and especially for the least-wealthy!" Where do you think value comes from? Especially when you subscribe to that logic in saying things like "but [abortions] would not be free, and they can never be free, so somebody somewhere will always have to pay for them." Value will always come from someone somewhere (or something, which is where anticapitalism and environmentalism high five); so unless you're proposing a system whereby all women prosper from the exploitation of men, your feminism-without-class grosses me out, because some women are going to get trampled.

And really, whatever you want to call it, if you are espousing an analysis of women's exploitation AGAINST an analysis of class, I'm not on board with it. I want what's good for all women, I don't just want women to have equal opportunities to become exploiters of others (including other women).

I let her have the last word at that, but I’ll update it if others comment and I feel compelled to respond again.